Saving the Big Banks is NOT Necessary to Prevant a Depression

President Obama's economic team argues that one of the main lessons from the Great Depression is that we have to save the banking system and restore "liquidity" at all costs.

Specifically, Obama's top economic advisors - Larry Summers, Timothy Geithner and Ben Bernanke - argue that the Great Depression occurred largely because the government did not do enough to restore liquidity to the banks and so the credit system shut down, which in turn shut down the entire economy. They believe that restoring liquidity to the nation's banks - and especially the giant banks such as Citi, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase - is essential.

But according to some of America's top economists, Obama's economic team is wrong.

For example, the Wall Street Journal interviewed Anna Schwartz in October 2008. Schwartz is the co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading book on the Great Depression (Friedman, the Nobel prize winning economist, is probably the most followed economist of the last 50 years). Schwartz is widely regarded as the leading living expert on monetary policy, and someone who actually lived through the Great Depression.

In the interview by the Journal, Schwartz said the current problem is a solvency crisis, not a liquidity crisis:

"The Fed," she argues, "has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible."

So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash, spreads haven't budged because banks don't know who is still solvent and who is not. This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is "the basic problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the real issue."

Indeed, in the article - entitled "Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War " - Schwartz says:

In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. As banks failed, depositors became alarmed that they'd lose their money if their bank, too, failed. So bank runs began, and these became self-reinforcing: "If the borrowers hadn't withdrawn cash, they [the banks] would have been in good shape. But the Fed just sat by and did nothing, so bank after bank failed. And that only motivated depositors to withdraw funds from banks that were not in distress," deepening the crisis and causing still more failures.

But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value."

"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement."

Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich agrees, writing in October:

Despite all the money going directly to the big banks, despite all the government guarantees and loans and special tax breaks, despite the shot-gun weddings and bank mergers, despite the willingness of the Treasury and the Fed to do almost whatever the banks have asked, the reality is that credit is not flowing.

Why? Because the underlying problem isn't a liquidity problem. As I've noted elsewhere, the problem is that lenders and investors don't trust they'll get their money back because no one trusts that the numbers that purport to value securities are anything but wishful thinking. The trouble, in a nutshell, is that the financial entrepreneurship of recent years -- the derivatives, credit default swaps, collateralized debt instruments, and so on -- has undermined all notion of true value.


Many of these fancy instruments became popular over recent years precisely because they circumvented financial regulations, especially rules on banks' capital adequacy. Big banks created all these off-balance-sheet vehicles because they allowed the big banks to carry less capital.

As the Huffington Post pointed out in March, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, economist James Galbraith, and - apparently - the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, agree:

Christina Romer, at a speech at the Brookings Institution Monday afternoon, appeared to give support to critics of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner who say that he is wrongly treating the economic collapse as a "liquidity crisis" when it is instead a crisis of solvency in the banking system brought on by a collapse in asset prices.

"Most obviously, like the Great Depression, today's downturn had its fundamental cause in the decline in asset prices and the failure or near-failure of financial institutions," she said in prepared remarks, where she compared and contrasted the current crisis with the Great Depression. The assets in question are, by and large, houses and other real estate....

It's more than just an academic question. The administration can't fix the economy if it can't accurately diagnose the problem. But if Romer did say publicly, in an explicit way, that the banking system faced a solvency crisis, that statement in itself could cause chaos in the markets as was seen on a smaller level when Sens. Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) and Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) said they were open to nationalizing insolvent banks, causing CitiGroup and other bank stocks to dive.

Critics of Geithner, including Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman, insist that the real problem is an asset collapse that led to a crisis of solvency in the banking system. In other words, Krugman argues that home values have come back to Earth, while Geithner hopes to solve the problem by pushing home values back to where they were. The conflict is a serious one because it dictates what response is appropriate.

Geithner's understanding of the crisis as one of liquidity -- which Fed chief Ben Bernanke agrees with -- leads to some bizarre conclusions, Krughman has written:

Thus, in a recent interview Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, tried to make a distinction between the "basic inherent economic value" of troubled assets and the "artificially depressed value" that those assets command right now. In recent transactions, even AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities have sold for less than 40 cents on the dollar, but Mr. Geithner seems to think they're worth much, much more.
And the government's job, he declared, is to "provide the financing to help get those markets working," pushing the price of toxic waste up to where it ought to be.

What's more, officials seem to believe that getting toxic waste properly priced would cure the ills of all our major financial institutions....

Economist James Galbraith, who has been critical of the administration's rescue effort as insufficient, said in an e-mail that "the recognition that the fundamental decline (collapse) in asset prices is the problem firmly contradicts the administration's line that credit is 'blocked' and can be made to 'flow.' The asset price (read: housing price) problem undercuts that completely, not so much by establishing insolvency of the banks, but by establishing the lack of credit-worthiness of the borrowers. Whether Christina Romer recognizes this is an interesting question."...
At a closed-door meeting with House Democrats on Monday night, according two members of Congress who were in the meeting, Geithner repeated that he believed the problem with the financial system was a lack of liquidity and that if he could get credit flowing again, the problem would right itself. Key to this analysis is the question of whether one thinks the rise of housing prices was an artificial bubble or if the collapse is reversible and we can return to those highs. Policymakers have resisted labeling it as a bubble. Romer, on Monday, came close, referring to a "run-up in housing prices that sure looks like a bubble."...

If the crisis is understood as one of liquidity, then the appropriate response is to continue injecting capital into the banking system and fiscal stimulus into the general economy until asset prices return toward previous highs. Japanese policymakers initially understood their crisis to be one of liquidity and injected hundreds of billions during the 1990s, to little effect. But if the problem is something different -- a solvency crisis brought on by essentially permanent asset-price declines -- then the policy response needed is different.

And in an essay today entitled "The risk of a double-dip recession is rising", well-known professor of economics Nouriel Roubini writes:

This is a crisis of solvency, not just liquidity, but true deleveraging has not begun yet because the losses of financial institutions have been socialised and put on government balance sheets. This limits the ability of banks to lend, households to spend and companies to invest...

The releveraging of the public sector through its build-up of large fiscal deficits risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending.

The question of whether the current crisis is mainly an insolvency crisis or a currency crisis is vital because - as noted above - the wrong diagnosis leads to the wrong government response.

As I have previously pointed out, many top economists say that we must break up the giant insolvent banks to save our economy. As Fortune, BusinessWeek and Federal Reserve governor Daniel K. Tarullo have all pointed out, breaking up the largest, insolvent banks would allow more competition from small to mid-size banks, and such banks may actually make more loans to small businesses.

Therefore, if the government has misdiagnosed a solvency crisis as a liquidity crisis, it better change its prescription quickly. If it does so, the patient may yet regain health. If not, the patient is in mortal danger.

The risk of a double-dip recession is rising

By Nouriel Roubini
Published: August 23 2009 18:55
The global economy is starting to bottom out from the worst recession and financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 the rate at which most advanced economies were contracting was similar to the gross domestic product free-fall in the early stage of the Depression. Then, late last year, policymakers who had been behind the curve finally started to use most of the weapons in their arsenal.

That effort worked and the free-fall of economic activity eased. There are three open questions now on the outlook. When will the global recession be over? What will be the shape of the economic recovery? Are there risks of a relapse?

On the first question it looks like the global economy will bottom out in the second half of 2009. In many advanced economies (the US, UK, Spain, Italy and other eurozone members) and some emerging market economies (mostly in Europe) the recession will not be formally over before the end of the year, as green shoots are still mixed with weeds. In some other advanced economies (Australia, Germany, France and Japan) and most emerging markets (China, India, Brazil and other parts of Asia and Latin America) the recovery has already started.

On the second issue the debate is between those – most of the economic consensus – who expect a V-shaped recovery with a rapid return to growth and those – like myself – who believe it will be U-shaped, anaemic and below trend for at least a couple of years, after a couple of quarters of rapid growth driven by the restocking of inventories and a recovery of production from near Depression levels.

There are several arguments for a weak U-shaped recovery . Employment is still falling sharply in the US and elsewhere – in advanced economies, unemployment will be above 10 per cent by 2010. This is bad news for demand and bank losses, but also for workers’ skills, a key factor behind long-term labour productivity growth.

Second, this is a crisis of solvency, not just liquidity, but true deleveraging has not begun yet because the losses of financial institutions have been socialised and put on government balance sheets. This limits the ability of banks to lend, households to spend and companies to invest.

Third, in countries running current account deficits, consumers need to cut spending and save much more, yet debt-burdened consumers face a wealth shock from falling home prices and stock markets and shrinking incomes and employment.

Fourth, the financial system – despite the policy support – is still severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and traditional banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalised.

Fifth, weak profitability – owing to high debts and default risks, low growth and persistent deflationary pressures on corporate margins – will constrain companies’ willingness to produce, hire workers and invest.

Sixth, the releveraging of the public sector through its build-up of large fiscal deficits risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending. The effects of the policy stimulus, moreover, will fizzle out by early next year, requiring greater private demand to support continued growth.

Seventh, the reduction of global imbalances implies that the current account deficits of profligate economies, such as the US, will narrow the surpluses of countries that over-save (China and other emerging markets, Germany and Japan). But if domestic demand does not grow fast enough in surplus countries, this will lead to a weaker recovery in global growth.

There are also now two reasons why there is a rising risk of a double-dip W-shaped recession. For a start, there are risks associated with exit strategies from the massive monetary and fiscal easing: policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. If they take large fiscal deficits seriously and raise taxes, cut spending and mop up excess liquidity soon, they would undermine recovery and tip the economy back into stag-deflation (recession and deflation).

But if they maintain large budget deficits, bond market vigilantes will punish policymakers. Then, inflationary expectations will increase, long-term government bond yields would rise and borrowing rates will go up sharply, leading to stagflation.

Another reason to fear a double-dip recession is that oil, energy and food prices are now rising faster than economic fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by excessive liquidity chasing assets and by speculative demand. Last year, oil at $145 a barrel was a tipping point for the global economy, as it created negative terms of trade and a disposable income shock for oil importing economies. The global economy could not withstand another contractionary shock if similar speculation drives oil rapidly towards $100 a barrel.

In summary, the recovery is likely to be anaemic and below trend in advanced economies and there is a big risk of a double-dip recession.

The writer is professor of economics at the Stern School of Business, NYU